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Abstract
When undertaking cyber security risk assessments, we must assign numeric
values to metrics to compute the final expected loss that represents the risk
that an organization is exposed to due to cyber threats. Even if risk assess-
ment is motivated from real-world observations and data, there is always
a high chance of assigning inaccurate values due to different uncertainties
involved (e.g., evolving threat landscape, human errors) and the natural
difficulty of quantifying risk per se. Our previous work [1] has proposed a
model and a software tool that empowers organizations to compute optimal
cyber security strategies given their financial constraints, i.e., available cyber
security budget. We have also introduced a general game-theoretic model
[2] with uncertain payoffs (probability-distribution-valued payoffs) showing
that such uncertainty can be incorporated in the game-theoretic model by
allowing payoffs to be random. In this paper, we combine our aforesaid
works and we conclude that although uncertainties in cyber security risk
assessment lead, on average, to different cyber security strategies, they do
not play significant role into the final expected loss of the organization when
using our model and methodology to derive this strategies. We show that
our tool is capable of providing effective decision support. To the best of
our knowledge this is the first paper that investigates how uncertainties on
various parameters affect cyber security investments.
Keywords: Cyber security investments, uncertainty, game theory.
1. Introduction
Many organizations do not have a solid foundation for an effective in-
formation security risk management. As a result, the increasingly evolving
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threat landscape in combination with the lack of appropriate cyber security
defenses poses several and important risks. On the other hand, the imple-
mentation of an optimal cyber security strategy (i.e., formal information
security processes; technical mechanisms; and organizational measures) is
not a straightforward process. In particular Small and Medium Enterprises
(SMEs) are a priority focus sector for governments’ economic policy. Given
that the majority of SMEs are restricted by limited budgets for investing in
cyber security, the situation becomes cumbersome, as without cyber secu-
rity mechanisms in place, they may be significantly impacted by inadvertent
attacks on their information systems and networks leading, in most cases, to
undesirable business effects.
Yet, it is not only the limited budgets. Even if these are available to
some extent, investing in cyber security is challenging due to the evolving
nature of cyber threats that introduces serious uncertainties when under-
taking cyber security risk assessments. This asymmetry can highlight an
investment decision from optimal to inefficient due to: (i) exploitation of
newly found vulnerabilities that were not patched by the latest investment;
and/or (ii) the mistaken values to risk assessment parameters, which lead
to erroneous optimal cyber security strategies. The purpose of this paper is
exactly that; “to investigate how uncertainties in conducting cyber security
risk assessment affect cyber security investments”.
1.1. Cyber security investments
According to a 2017 IBM report [3], despite the decline (10% percent) in
the overall cost of a data breach over previous years to $3.62 million, com-
panies in this year’s study are having larger breaches. A study conducted by
the Ponemon Institute [4], in 2015, on behalf of the security firm Damballa
shows that although businesses spend an average of $1.27 million annually
and 395 people-hours each week responding to false alerts, thanks to faulty
intelligence and alerts, breaches have actually gone up dramatically in the
past three years.
The main challenges faced by organizations when it comes to investing
in cyber security can be summarized as follows:
• lack of methods of determining accurate values for risk assessment
parameters;
• complexity of developing a holistic methodology that models an orga-
nization’s environments, performs risks assessment and finally derives
an optimal investment solution; and
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• new threats emerge changing the level of risk derived prior to their
appearance and therefore making the most recent investment non-
optimal.
The literature of economics of security is quite rich and it comes to
methodologies for investing in cyber security [5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. In our previous
works [1], [10] we compared different decision support methodologies for se-
curity managers to tackle the challenge of investing in security for SMEs. To
undertake the risk assessment of the proposed model, we used fixed values
for the payoffs of the players (i.e., defender and attacker). These values were
set by using a mapping from the SANS Critical Security Controls [11] com-
bined with the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) Top 25 Software
Vulnerabilities [12]. The data for this paper was published here [13]. Al-
though the use of data from well-known sources made our risk assessment
valid and important, this approach ignored the fact that in real-world sce-
narios there is a very high amount of uncertainty when setting the payoff
values. And in fact, even the data used in [1], is just as accurate as the
activities taken by experts when defining these values. But such activities
are prone to error due to: (i) being subjective to the human experience each
time; (ii) the evolving threat landscape that unavoidably dictates new risk
assessment values; and (iii) new assets being added to an organization’s envi-
ronment (i.e., infrastructure) therefore altering the current security posture
of the organization.
1.2. Decision under uncertainty
Decision problems often involve uncertainty about the consequences of
the potential actions. Currently existing decision support methods use to
either ignore this uncertainty or reduce existing information (e.g., by aggre-
gating several values into a single number) to simplify the process. However,
such approaches lose a lot of information. In [2], we introduce a game the-
oretic model where the consequences of actions and the payoffs are indeed
random and, consequently, they are described as probability distributions.
Even though the full space of probability distributions cannot be ordered,
a subset of suitable loss distributions that satisfy a few mild conditions can
be totally ordered in a way that agrees with a general intuition of risk min-
imization. We show that existing algorithms from the case of scalar-valued
payoffs can be adapted to the situation of distribution-valued payoffs. In
particular, an adaption of the fictitious play algorithm allows computation
of a Nash equilibrium for a zero-sum game. This equilibrium then represents
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the optimal way to decide among several options.The model is described in
more depth and illustrated with an example in [14].
An area where such a framework is particularly useful is risk manage-
ment. Risk is often assessed by experts and thus depends on many factors,
including the risk appetite of the person doing the assessment. Additionally,
the effects of actions are rarely deterministic but rather depend on external
influences. Therefore, it is recommended by the German Federal Office of
Information Security to do a qualitative risk assessment which is consistent
with our approach. We have applied the framework to model security risks
in critical utilities such as a water distribution system in [15]. In this situa-
tion, consequences are difficult to predict as consumers are not homogeneous
and thus do not act like a single (reasonable) person. Another situation that
can be modeled with this generalized game-theoretic approach is that of an
advanced persistent threat (APT) [16]. Recently, this type of attack has
gained a lot of attention due to major incidents such as Stuxnet [17] or the
attack on the Ukrainian power grid [18].
2. Proposed Methodology
Our work is inspired from two previous papers [1] and [2] to investigate
how uncertainties regarding cyber security risk assessment values affect the
efficiency of cyber security investments that have been built upon game-
theoretic and combinatorial optimization techniques (a multi-objective mul-
tiple choice Knapsack based strategy). These uncertainties are reflected on
the payoffs of the organization (henceforth refered to as the Defender). Al-
though [1] was proven interesting and validated the UK’s government afore-
said advice, it certainly did not account for uncertainties in the payoffs of
the Defender. In real world scenarios, defenders almost always operate with
incomplete information, and often a rough estimate on the relative magni-
tude of known cyber threats is the only information available to the cyber
security managers. Furthermore, practical security engineers will argue that
it is already difficult to obtain detailed information on risk assessment pa-
rameters. We envisage that by merging these two approaches, we will be
able to offer a decision support tool for cyber security investments with in-
creased resiliency against threats facing SMEs. More importantly, our work
addresses a wider class of cyber threats than commodity cyber threats, which
were investigated in [1]. Although this assumption does not negate the pos-
sibility of zero-day vulnerabilities, it removes the expectation that it is in
the best interest of either player to invest heavily in order to either find a
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new vulnerability or be able to protect against these unknown vulnerabil-
ities. Therefore, in the present paper, we address even cyber attacks that
target an organization with all means (i.e., advanced persistent threats).
2.1. Cyber security Control Games with Uncertainty
The Cyber security Control Games (CSCGs) developed so far [1] do not
yet capture a problem that often arises in real life and especially in cyber
security: a crisp prediction of the efficacy of cyber security controls as well
as the values of the various other risk assessment parameters is often not
possible. Rather, some intuitive information is available that describe some
values as more likely than others. In this paper, we enrich the model recently
presented in [1] by considering uncertainty in payoffs of the Defender (and
of the Attacker since we play a zero sum game) in CSCG. This is a two-
stage cyber security investments model that supports security managers
with decisions regarding the optimal allocation of their financial resources
in presence of uncertainty regarding the different risk assessment values.
For a specific set of targets of the Attacker and security controls to be
implemented by the Defender, our approach to cyber security risk assessment
consists of two main steps. First, a zero-sum CSCG is solved to derive the
optimal level at which the control should be implemented to minimize the
expected damage if a target is attacked. This game accounts for uncertainty
about the effectiveness of a control using probability-distribution as payoffs
instead of crisp numbers. In previous work [2], we show that imposing some
mild restrictions on these distributions admits the construction of a total
ordering on a (useful) subset of probability distributions which allows to
transfer solution concepts like the Nash equilibrium to this new setting.
The most critical part in estimating the damage caused by a cyber se-
curity attack is predicting the efficacy of a control to protect a target t. Let
us assume that we decide to implement the control at some level l; then we
denote the efficacy of the control to protect target t as E(l, t). Typically, it is
difficult to estimate this value, even if l and t are known. Thus, we replace the
exact value of E(l, t) by a Gaussian distribution centered around the most
likely value e(l, t) with a fixed variance σ2. For simplicity, we assume that
the uncertainty is equal for each cyber security control and implementation
level. This assumption can be relaxed if we have obtained an accurate value
about the efficacy of a cyber security process (i.e., a control implemented
at some level). In order to avoid negative efficacy, we truncate the Gaussian
distributions to get a proper probability distribution on [0, 1). Allowing the
efficacy of an implementation of a control at level l on target t to be random
yields a random cyber security loss S(l, t) = I(t)T (t) [1− E(l, t)]. This is
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the expected damage (e.g., losing some data asset) that the Defender suffers
when t is attacked and a control has implemented at level l. This defini-
tion of loss is in line with the well-known formula, risk = expected damage
I(t) × probability of occurrence T (t) [19]. We assume that this loss will
take values in a compact subset of [1,∞). The losses in our games are thus
random variables, so at this point, we explicitly deviate from the classical
route of game theory. In particular, we do not reduce the random payoffs to
expected values or similar real-valued representatives. Instead, we will de-
fine our games to reward us in terms of a complete probability distribution,
which is convenient for several reasons:
• working with the entire probability distribution preserves all informa-
tion available to the modeler when the games are defined. In other
words, if empirical data or expertise on losses or utilities is available,
then condensing it into a humble average sacrifices unnecessarily large
amounts of information;
• it equips the modeler with the whole armory of statistics to define the
payoff distribution, instead of forcing the modeler to restrict oneself to
a “representative value”. The latter is often a practical obstacle, since
losses are not always easily quantifiable nor expressible on numeric
scales (for example, if the game is about critical infrastructures and if
human lives are at stake, a quantification in terms of “payoff” simply
appears inappropriate).
Note that uncertainty in our case is essentially different to the kind
of uncertainty that Bayesian or signaling games capture. While the latter
is about uncertainty in the opponent the uncertainty in our case is about
the payoff itself. The crucial difference is that Bayesian games nonetheless
require a precise modeling of payoffs for all players of all types. This is only
practically feasible for a finite number of types (though theoretically not
limited to this). In contrast, our games embody an infinitude of different
possible outcomes (types of opponents) in a single payoff, thus simplifying
the structure of the game back into a standard matrix game, while offering
an increased level of generality over Bayesian or signaling games.
In CSCG (a matrix game), Defender and Attacker have finite pure strat-
egy spaces L, T (where l ∈ L, t ∈ T ) and a payoff structure of the Defender,
denoted by A, which in light of the uncertainties intrinsic to cyber secu-
rity risk assessment, is a matrix of random variables. During the game-
play, each player takes its actions at random, which determines a row and
column for the payoff distribution Fi,j . Repeating the game, each round
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delivers a different random payoff Rij ∼ Fij whose distribution is condi-
tional on the chosen scenario i ∈ L, j ∈ T . Thus, we obtain the function
Fij(r) = Pr(Rij ≤ r|i, j). By playing mixed strategies, the distribution of
the overall expected random payoff R is obtained from the law of total prob-
ability by
(F (Φ,Θ))(r) = Pr(R ≤ r) =
∑
i,j
Pr(Rij ≤ r|i, j) · Pr(i, j) = ΦTAΘ, (1)
when Φ,Θ are the mixed strategies supported on L, T and the player’s moves
are stochastically independent (e.g., no signaling).
Unlike classical repeated games, where a mixed strategy is chosen to
optimize a long-run average revenue, equation (1) optimizes the distribution
F (Φ,Θ), which is the same (identical) for every repetition of the game. The
game is in that sense static, but (unlike its conventional counterpart) does
not induce repetitions in practice, since the payoffs are random (in each
round), but all having the same distribution. Thus, the “distribution-valued
payoff” is always the same (whether there are repetitions of the game or
not).
2.2. Investment Optimization Problem with Uncertainty
When having c cyber security controls, our plan for cyber investment
is to solve c CSCGs by splitting each of them up to a set of m − 1 con-
trol subgames with n targets and up to λ implementation levels for each
control, where λ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (we set λ = 0 to indicate that the control
is not implemented at all). For a CSCG the Control Subgame equilibria
constitute the CSCG solution [1]. Given the Control Subgame equilibria
we then use a Knapsack algorithm to provide the general investment solu-
tion. The equilibria provide us with information regarding the way in which
each security control is best implemented, so as to maximize the benefit of
the control with regard to both the A’s strategy, and the indirect costs of
the organization. For convenience, we denote the Control Subgame solution
by the maximum level of implementation available. For instance, for control
cj the solution of Control Subgame Gjλ is denoted by Q∗jλ. Let us assume
that for control j the equilibria of all Control Subgames are given by the
set {Q∗j0, . . . , Q∗jm}. For each control there exists a unique Control Subgame
solution Qj0, which dictates that control j should not be used.
We define an optimal solution to the Knapsack problem as
Ψ = {Q∗jλ}, ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , c}, ∀λ ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
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.
A solution Ψ takes exactly one solution (i.e., equilibrium or cyber security
plan) for each control as a policy for implementation. To represent the cyber
security investment problem, we need to expand the definitions for both
expected damage S and effectiveness E to incorporate the Control Subgame
solutions. Hence, we expand S such that S(Qjλ, t), which is the expected
damage on target t given the implementation of Qjλ. Likewise, we expand
the definition of the effectiveness of the implemented solution on a given
target as E(Qjλ, t). Additionally, we consider Γ(Qjλ) as the direct cost of
implementing Qjλ. If we represent the solution Ψ by the bit-vector ~z, we can
then represent the 0-1 Multiple Choice, Multi-Objective Knapsack Problem
as presented in (2).
max
~z
∑n
i=0
{{
1−∑cj=1∑mλ=0E(Qjλ, ti) zjλ} I(ti)T (ti)
}
t
s.t.
c∑
j=1
m∑
λ=0
Γ(Qjλ), zjλ ≤ B
m∑
λ=0
zjλ = 1, zjλ ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j = 1, . . . , c. (2)
whereB is the available cyber security budget, and zjλ = 1 whenQ
∗
jλ ∈ Ψ. In
addition, we consider a tie-break condition in which if multiple solutions are
viable, in terms of maximizing the minimum, according to the above function
we will select the solution with the lowest cost. This ensures that an orga-
nization is not advised to spend more on security than would produce the
same net effect. In Fig. 1, we have illustrated the overview of the methodol-
ogy followed to provide an optimal cyber security advice supporting decision
makers with deciding about optimal cyber security investments.
3. Experiments
The results presented here represent the outcomes of experiments run
using a test case comprised of a sample of 10 controls and 13 vulnerabilities
from [13] with different levels of uncertainty at each budget level. All the
reported results are collected in Fig. 2 and the expected damage is defined
as a normalised value between 0 and 100. In the following paragraphs, we
will discuss the characteristics of each budget level.
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Figure 1: Overview of the cyber security investment methodology proposed in [1].
The tables presented in this section present the best strategies seen at
each budget level when tested with different levels of uncertainty. The num-
ber represents the optimal level that a control should be implemented at,
where 1 dictates the simplest possible configuration, 5 dictates the best but
most restrictive possible configuration, and 0 represents no implementation
of the control.
Budget 5: The expected damage is distributed primarily between 35
and 45. With lower budgets, there are fewer viable solutions. There are
few solutions that provide both good coverage and fall within the budget
range, making the discovery of optimal solutions more difficult. The closer
the direct cost of a solution tends towards the budget, the more likely the
solution under uncertainty will exceed the budget and incur the penalty, this
is prominent at the 5% level of uncertainty.
With a very limited budget, the number of viable solutions are limited.
With low uncertainty we see in Table 1, all optimal solutions tend towards
implementing only two controls.
With uncertainty greater than 0.2, we see a different solution, where
the first control is implemented at a lower level, with the third control
implemented at a higher level.
Budget 10: Unlike the lower budget level, we see that the average
expected damage falls in the range of 26 to 29, which is half the range seen
at budget 5. With more controls available, the expected damage should
go down, however at the same time we see that the solutions become more
consistent. The standard deviation is less than 2.5, with a difference in
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Figure 2: Expected damage tracked against uncertainty for each experimental configura-
tion.
means that never exceeds 2.
Table 2 shows that the optimal results for budget 10 build on the basic
pattern from those at budget 5, suggesting implementations for both controls
1 and 3 regardless of the level of uncertainty. With low uncertainty, control
9 is considered optimal, but at higher levels of uncertainty, controls 7 and
10 are considered optimal.
Budget 15: For a budget of 15, we see that the mean expected damage
is between 19 and 22. At this budget and higher, we see that the difference
in means between the certain and uncertain solutions never exceeds 1. With
the increased budget over the previous results, the optimal solution in Table
3, now always considers a combination of the first three controls, where
the rest of the budget is used to sporadically patch the worst remaining
vulnerabilities as dictated by uncertainty. This means that at lower levels of
uncertainty control 4 is preferred, while at higher levels of uncertainty, we
see that control 10 becomes the favoured addition to the base set of controls,
with control 9 preferred at 10% uncertainty.
Budget 20: The range of average expected damage is limited to less
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Table 1: Optimal Solutions for Budget=5
Uncertainty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0% 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5% 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10% 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15% 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20% 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25% 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 2: Optimal Solutions for Budget=10
Uncertainty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0% 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0
5% 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0
10% 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0
15% 4 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
20% 4 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
25% 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Table 3: Optimal Solutions for Budget=15
Uncertainty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0% 4 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
5% 4 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
10% 4 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
15% 4 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
20% 4 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
25% 4 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Table 4: Budget=20
Uncertainty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0% 5 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
5% 5 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
10% 5 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
15% 5 4 2 0 0 0 0 1 2 0
20% 5 4 2 0 0 0 0 1 2 0
25% 5 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0
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than 1, with the biggest discrepancy between certain and uncertain solution
at the 20% uncertainty level.
The optimal solutions from Table 4 add little to the general pattern of
solutions that precede it, implementing the first 3 controls at varying levels.
This is the only time that we see the optimal solution suggest the highest
level of implementation for control 1. Here, control 10 is preferred at lower
levels of uncertainty. At higher levels, this and control 4 are replace by a
combination of controls 7 and 8.
Table 5: Solutions
Table 6: Optimal Solutions for Budget 25.
Uncertainty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0% 4 4 3 3 0 0 0 3 0 0
5% 4 4 3 3 0 0 0 3 0 0
10% 4 4 3 3 0 0 0 3 0 0
15% 4 4 1 3 0 0 0 2 3 0
20% 4 4 1 3 0 0 0 2 3 0
25% 3 2 3 3 0 0 1 0 4 0
Table 7: Solutions
Table 8: Base Solutions for All Budget Tested.
Budget 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
5 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 4 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 5 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 3 2 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
Budget 25: Considering the highest budget tested, we see that the
average expected damage has a range of 1, between 13.2 and 14.2. This
results in a difference in means of at most 0.4 and a minimum of 0.025.
This is combined with standard deviations of no greater than 1.2 to provide
consistent results between certain and uncertain solutions.
From Table 6, the main difference in solutions is that control 4 becomes
a permanent suggestion for implementation in addition to the other 3 core
controls. Up to 20% uncertainty, we see some variation of 6 controls, with
consistent solutions up to 10% uncertainty and a common solution at 15%
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and 20% uncertainty.
At 25% uncertainty we see that the optimal solution deviates away from
those solutions below. As with all of the results, despite a different solution,
we still see a similar expected damage with the solution created in certain
space. With uncertainty and a wide range of available configurations, it is
reasonable to consider that there will be a number of solutions that offer
similar results. Given that it still shares common factors, we can consider
that most of the mitigation is handled by those four controls. The mitigation
of the additional controls covers the change in values caused by uncertainty,
this is similar to the case seen at 15% uncertainty.
The following section highlights a number of common themes across the
results, considering the expected results as well as themes consistent with
the optimal solutions.
4. Discussion
Across all of the results in Fig. 2, we see only a small difference in
mean expected damage between the optimal results with certain and uncer-
tain parameters. This is represented by a difference in the mean values of
comparable results not exceeding one standard deviation. While some of
the consistency is due to multiple evaluations of solutions, the nature of the
designs of the solutions similarly reduces the impact. The hybrid optimi-
sation approach requires multiple different negative perturbations on values
to be offset by positive perturbations on other controls before the impact
will be seen. The value suggested by the expected damage captures these
differences in the deviation of the results from the mean.
The optimal results demonstrate a number of changes to the investment
strategy as the uncertainty increases. This change can be explained as a
combination of the factors that are uncertain. In general, this will be as
a result of some controls becoming more effective than others at similar
tasks. Less common results will have optimal solutions that might not be
considered valid under a certain set of parameters, but based on uncertainty
in the costs, would appear to be genuine.
It is with this last point that we find one of the sources for deviation
in the average expected damage seen in the previous section. Above, we
discuss having potentially invalid solutions seen to optimal, but we also
need to consider the case, where the most optimal solution was eliminated
due to potentially having a cost that would exceed the budget.
Uncertainty in the cost is represented most prominently in the results
at low budgets. This is due to the number of viable solutions that can be
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tested, since most solutions will exceed the budget. With this, the search
space for solutions features more local optima, with less coherent strategies
for traversal.
The consistency in the results can be explained by the coverage of certain
controls and their effectiveness at completing that task. Across all the results
displayed in Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4, we see that control 1 is always selected,
and with some limited exceptions, so is control 3. This gives us an impact on
multiple vulnerabilities tested, causing a reduction in the expected damage.
It is only at higher budgets, we see that the impact of multiple controls
better filling the role of control 3 causes it to be replaced in the optimal
solutions.
In addition to the idea that we see consistent results across low levels of
uncertainty, we also see that the results identify that although there are a
number of differences in the precise optimal solution, there is commonality
among all of the optimal solutions present.
The trial was performed with a small set of attacks and controls. Increas-
ing the number of controls and vulnerabilities could increase the potential
for less consistent solutions, due to more overlap of controls. Regardless of
the composition, good coverage of attack vectors is achieved as the optimal
set of controls will always aim to mitigate the most expected damage across
all targets.
A desired outcome of the experimental work was to see the extent of the
commonality of optimal solutions for each of the levels of uncertainty. As
has been explained above, we see that there are a number of commonalities,
especially at the same budget levels. Table 8 shows the minimal set of
controls and levels that are implemented regardless of the uncertainty.
In comparison to the optimal results for each of the budget levels, we see
that these share common features on the first three controls, and later control
4. It is these controls that provide a base coverage of the attack vectors,
as described previously. The worst performing base is that of budget 10,
which reflects that of the budget 5, this is due to the deviation between low
uncertainty and high uncertainty solutions.
From the cyber security perspective, we consider that there are sets
of advice such as the UK’s Cyber Essentials, that promote a number of
controls. These pieces of advice suggest a set of controls that are reasonable
to implement regardless of the degree of complexity or available budget. The
base solutions shown here offer the same approach, demonstrating, what
a solution should contain based on a constrained budget and uncertainty.
These base solutions should be taken as a reference point for building secure
systems, with decisions made regarding company specific requirements.
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5. Conclusions and future work
This work extended previous work published in the field of decision sup-
port for cyber security. It has demonstrated an approach to cyber secu-
rity investments under uncertainty, where a previous risk assessment based
model was extended for this purpose. To explore this, a series of experi-
ments looking at optimal cyber security investments under uncertainty were
performed. Uncertainty is naturally a challenge that all cyber security man-
agers face when they have to take decisions. The derivation of exact values
for various risk assessment parameters seems like an impossible task. Our
work here highlights, that even with some uncertainty in factors that impact
payoffs and viable strategies, there is consistency in the outcomes, where the
majority of damage was being mitigated by only a few cyber security con-
trols. Although we have concluded to a set of numerical results that clearly
demonstrate the benefit of our model and methodology, the expected exten-
sion of this work, would be to apply the proposed tools to a full realistic
case study, allowing for a comparison to expert judgments, capturing where
and how the uncertainty arises.
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